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Unemployment Insurance Design: inducing moving and
retraining∗
John Hassler Jose´ V. Rodr´õguez Mora
April 5, 2004
Abstract
Evidence suggests that unemployed individuals sometimes can aﬀect their
job prospects by undertaking a costly action like deciding to move or retrain.
Realistically, such an opportunity arises only for some individuals and the iden-
tity of those is unobservable. Unemployment insurance should then be designed
to induce individuals to exploit existing opportunities to move or retrain with-
out excessively diminishing the insurance value for the remaining unemployed.
This problem has been neglected in previous literature on unemployment insur-
ance design and we show that it may have important consequences. In partic-
ular, we derive closed-form solutions showing that when the moving/retraining
incentive constraint binds, unemployment beneÞts should increase over the un-
employment spell, having an initial period with low beneÞts and a substantial
increase after this period has expired.
JEL ClassiÞcation: J65, J64, E24
Keywords: Unemployment beneÞts, search, moral hazard, adverse selec-
tion
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1 Introduction
An important feature of the modern welfare state is the existence of an extensive
unemployment insurance (UI) system. It is now well established that the design of
the unemployment insurance aﬀects the incidence of unemployment by distorting
the incentives of unemployed to search for a job (see, e.g., Holmlund (1998) for a
survey). This has motivated a growing literature on how the UI system should be
designed to make an optimal trade-oﬀ between providing good insurance on the one
hand, and not distorting the incentives too much, on the other. The seminal paper
by Shavell and Weiss (1979) characterizes the optimal design of UI when search
activity is unobservable. Since then, a line of papers that extend the analysis has
appeared. For example, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) allow a more general set
of policies; speciÞcally, they assume that in addition to UI-beneÞts, also taxes paid
by employed can be made contingent on the employment history of the individual.
An important assumption in Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997), is that the insurer can fully control the individuals consumption  usually
interpreted as the individual having no access to markets for saving and borrowing
and no alternative sources of income. It has proven diﬃcult to relax the assumption
of no hidden savings, but recently important progress has been made in this respect
(see Pavoni (2001), Arpad and Pavoni (2002) andWerning (2002)). Other important
extensions of the analysis, for example allowing sequential search, endogenous wage
formation, job-creation and production, has also been done in recent years (see,
e.g., Shimer and Werning (2003) , Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), Abdulkadiroglu,
Kuruscu and Sahin (2002), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) and Heer (2003)).
In this paper, we will maintain most of the standard assumptions in the literature
but cast the focus on an important informational problem that has been largely
neglected. SpeciÞcally, we will consider the case when some, but not all, unemployed
can increase the probability of being hired by undertaking a costly investment, e.g.,
by retraining or moving to a location with better employment prospects. Under
the realistic assumption that the insurer is unable to observe who has this option,
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an incentive problem arises and a failure to take this into account may lead to
sub-optimal UI-design. One conceivable way to mitigate the problem would be to
oﬀer subsidies to moving or retraining. However, as we will argue below, full cost-
compensation is not feasible in the realistic case when the insurer can not fully
distinguish voluntary and involuntary job-separations.
Although an empirical investigation is outside the scope of this paper, we argue
that the consequences of not providing reasonable incentives for people to move or
retrain may be of substantial quantitative importance. For instance, Bartel (1979)
documents that the proportion of geographical mobility in the U.S. caused by the
decision to change jobs is one-half of all migration decisions for young workers
and one third of all migration decisions for workers above the age of 45. Fur-
thermore, geographical mobility is substantially lower in continental Europe, and
Hassler, Rodr´õguez Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2004), hereafter called HRSZ,
document in panel-data a negative correlation between geographical mobility and
UI-generosity as well as between mobility and aggregate unemployment rates. Other
empirical documentations of the link between unemployment and geographical mo-
bility are DaVanzo (1978), Pissarides andWadsworth (1989) and McCormick (1997).
In, HRSZ, a constant UI-beneÞt level is assumed and, of course, the higher this
is, the weaker are the incentives to move. Following the tradition in the optimal
UI-design literature, we will investigate if non-constant beneÞt rates can strengthen
the incentives to move without reducing the insurance value of UI. Since we believe
that also the standard moral hazard problem of providing incentives for a continuous
job-search are important, we will include this in the analysis.
There is empirical evidence indicating that precautionary saving is used in order
to self-insure against unemployment risk. Using PSID, Gruber (1997) Þnds that, in
absence of UI, consumption falls by 22% when an individual become unemployed,
showing that individuals are able to smooth consumption also when there is no UI.
Similarly, Engen and Gruber (2001) show that UI crowds out Þnancial savings, in-
dicating that households use Þnancial markets to self-insure against unemployment
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risk.1 The assumption that the insurer can perfectly control individual consumption
is thus not entirely realistic. Building on the emerging tradition in the recent papers
cited above, we will therefore allow the individual to make her own consumption
decisions, allowing access to a market for saving and borrowing.
To facilitate understanding of the results, we will make assumptions that allow
analytical characterizations and, speciÞcally, graphical and closed form solutions for
optimal beneÞts as well as for observables like the changes in individual consump-
tions levels associated with a change of job status. Our model also easily lends
itself to allowing multiple incentive problems, e.g., adding a moral hazard problem
in job-retention eﬀort like in Wang and Williamson (1996).
Two important assumptions are key to analytical tractability; First, we assume
constant absolute risk-aversion implying that search incentives are independent of
asset holdings. Second; Individuals have access to a perfect market for borrowing
and lending. As shown in Werning (2002), a constant beneÞt scheme is optimal
under these assumptions when search eﬃciency is constant. This allows us to focus
on simple beneÞt schemes with a limited number of beneÞt levels. Neither of the
key assumptions is perfectly realistic, and the model does therefore not directly lend
itself to quantitative policy recommendations. Our purpose is instead to illustrate
a mechanism not previously explored in the literature, thereby providing guidance
for future quantitative work.
The paper is structured in the following way. The model is presented in section
2, where in subsection 2.1 we derive the relevant value functions, in subsection 2.2
incentive compatibility constraints are derived. In section 3 and subsection 3.1 the
main results are derived and discussed and section 4 concludes. Some proofs can
be found in the text, others in the appendix and the remaining are available upon
request from the authors.
1Also if access to the formal capital market is limited, alternative means to smooth consumption
may exist, see e.g., Cullen and Gruber (2000).
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2 The model
Consider an economy in continuous time where individuals can be employed or
unemployed. They have access to a market for safe saving and borrowing with
an exogenous return r, equal to the subjective discount rate (possibly including
a positive probability of dying). Unemployed individuals can aﬀect their chances
of Þnding a job. As noted in the introduction, we will focus on the case where
some, but not necessarily all, individuals can make a costly investment increasing
their chances of becoming employed. Allowing unobservable heterogeneity in this
respect creates and informational problem similar to an adverse selection problem
and makes full insurance infeasible.2 In addition, we will allow a more standard
moral hazard problem where search activity entails a ßow cost.
SpeciÞcally, we assume that employed individuals loose their jobs at rate q. A
share p ∈ [0, 1] of those who loose their job can undertake a costly investment. We
will interpret this as representing a cost of moving, denoted m > 0 (for example
between geographical locations or between occupations that require some retrain-
ing). For simplicity, we assume that if the unemployed pays this cost (moves), she
is immediately rehired. Unemployed who cannot, or decide not to move and who
search for a job Þnd one at rate h. Searching has a cost of s ≥ 0 per unit of time.
We may consider this cost as representing the opportunity cost of searching, arising
from, for example, some alternative economic activity. Whether the agent actually
searches or not and whether she has the opportunity to move are assumed to be
her own private information. To make the problem interesting, we assume that it
is optimal to induce individuals to search and move (if they have the opportunity).
It is easy to show that under this assumption, agents who have the option to move
should be induced to do so immediately. Therefore, in the optimal solution, no mass
2There are few papers on UI deal with adverse selection. One recent paper is Hagedorn, Kaul
and Memmel (2003), where individuals have diﬀerent hiring rates are separated by being oﬀered
diﬀerent menues of beneÞts.
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of agents should be unemployed while having the opportunity to move.
An employed individual is said to be in state 1, receiving an exogenous gross
wage w. An individual who looses her job and do not move enters into state 2 and
is then called short-term unemployed, receiving beneÞts denoted b2. To analyze the
issue of whether unemployment beneÞts should be increasing or decreasing, we allow
two beneÞt levels, b2 and b3, the latter being given to individuals in state 3, who
are denoted long-term unemployed. The assumption of only two unemployment
states is not important for the results.3 To facilitate a simple presentation of the
results, we assume that an individual in state 2 enters state 3 with a constant
instantaneous probability f .4 Since state 3 is an administrative state associated
with long unemployment duration, we assume individuals who search to have the
same hiring rates, h, in the two unemployment states.5. Motivated by practical
considerations, and in contrast to, e.g., Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), we assume
that beneÞt levels can be given conditional only on current unemployment status
(2 or 3), not not on employment history or asset holdings.
Individuals maximize their intertemporal utility, given by
E
Z ∞
0
e−rtU (ct) dt,
where ct is consumption at time t and r the subjective discount rate. In order to
facilitate analytical solutions when individuals have access to markets for saving
and borrowing, we choose the CARA utility function
U (ct) ≡ −e−γct ,
where γ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion.6 All individuals are born (enter
3Proof available upon request.
4This assumption implies that seach incentives remain constant as long as the individual remain
in state 2. An alternative would be to use discrete time and assume that short-term UI beneÞts are
paid for one period only as done by e.g., Cahuc and Lehmann (2000). Assuming that UI beneÞts
change after some Þxed period of time would make search incentives depend on the remaining time
of current beneÞts and considerably complicate the analysis with little gain.
5This assumption could, however, easily be relaxed.
6Given this, assets will not aﬀect individual decisions. For other utility functions, the decision
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the labor market) as employed without assets and are identical at that point.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss how an unemployment insurance system
should be constructed when there are incentive problems. To his end, we want to
remove other motives for unemployment beneÞts than providing insurance. In par-
ticular, we are in this paper not interested in motives to use the UI system to create
non-actuarial transfers between individuals with diﬀerent characteristics.7 There-
fore, we assume that individuals face an actuarially fair insurance. This means
that when an individual enters the labor force, the expected present discounted
value of the beneÞts she will receive during her life-time exactly balances the ex-
pected present discounted value of her contributions. An alternative interpretation
of actuarial fairness is that in a decentralized equilibrium, where individuals can
sign binding insurance contracts with competitive insurance companies when enter-
ing their Þrst job, actuarial fairness is identical to a break-even condition for the
insurance companies, which would be satisÞed under perfect competition.8
Without loss of generality, we let individuals pay lump-sum taxes, denoted τ ,
implying that
úAt = rAt + ω − ct − τ , (1)
except at the points in time when the cost of moving is paid, and where ω ∈
{w, b1 − s, b2 − s}, depending on the employment state. We deÞne the average
discounted probabilities (ADPs) of being in state 2 and 3, respectively, by
Π2 ≡ r
Z ∞
0
e−rtµ2,tdt,
Π3 ≡ r
Z ∞
0
e−rtµ3,tdt.
to move and to search for a job would depend on the individual asset level. Then, asset dependent
beneÞts would be required to satisfy the incentive constraints exactly. We believe that some asset
dependence, like a means-tested UI-system might be reasonable, but we leave such schemes for
future research.
7For positive implications, the redistributive elements of unemployment insurance are, however,
central. See e.g., Wright (1986).
8Since we use the CARA speciÞcation, individual assets do not aﬀect preference over insurance
so older employed agents with non-zero asset holdings would not want to renegotiate their contract.
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where µ2,t and µ3,t are the probabilities of being short term and long term unem-
ployed at time t, respectively, conditional on being employed at time zero. Solving
for the ADPs assuming that individuals who can move do so and that unemployed
search for a job yields
Π2 ≡ q h+ r
(r + h+ q) (r + h+ f)
, (2)
Π3 ≡ Π2 f
h+ r
,
where q ≡ q (1− p) equals the rate of ßow into unemployment.
The actuarial fairness requirement of the UI system can then be written
τ = Π2b2 +Π3b3. (3)
2.1 Value functions and consumption
It is well known that the value functions for the three states can be written as
Vj (At) = −1
r
e−γrAte−γσj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (4)
where σj are state-dependent constants and where the state dependent consumption
functions are
cj (At) = rAt + σj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (5)
Note from (5) that individuals optimally consume the permanent income from
their asset holdings (rAt) plus a state dependent constant σj . As we see from (5),
the diﬀerences in consumption between employed and unemployed individuals with
identical assets holdings, i.e., c1 (At)−c2 (At) and c1 (At)−c3 (At), are independent
of At and given σ1 − σ2 and σ1 − σ3, respectively. These diﬀerences will be of key
importance for our analysis and we therefore deÞne
σ1 − σ2 ≡ ∆2 and σ1 − σ3 ≡ ∆3. (6)
Using these deÞnition, it is straightforward to check that the Bellman equation
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for the individuals who search and move is satisÞed if the constants σj , satisfy
σ1 = w − τ − q pe
γrm + (1− p) eγ(∆2) − 1
γr
, (7)
σ2 = b2 − s− τ + h1− e
−γ(∆2)
γr
− f e
γ(∆3−∆2) − 1
γr
,
σ3 = b3 − s− τ + h1− e
−γ(∆3)
γr
,
in which case individual intertemporal utility is maximized under (1) and a No-Ponzi
condition.
Our objective is to maximize welfare of an individual entering the labor market
with no assets, V1 (0), subject to incentive constraints and actuarial fairness. From
(4), we note that i) this is equivalent to maximizing σ1, subject to the constraints,
and ii) the solution will maximize welfare of all employed, regardless of their asset
holdings and previous employment history.
Our procedure will be done in two steps. First, we will maximize σ1 over the
consumption diﬀerences subject to incentive constraints (to be deÞned shortly) and
actuarial fairness, thus Þnding the optimal ∆2 and ∆3. Second, we characterize the
unique combination of beneÞts b2 and b3 that implements the optimal allocation.
To do this and to express actuarial fairness (3) in terms of ∆2 and ∆3, we subtract
the second and third line of (7), respectively, from the Þrst, yielding
∆2 = w − (b2 − s)− qpe
γrm + (1− p) eγ∆2 − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆2
γr
+ f
eγ(∆3−∆2) − 1
γr
,
(8)
∆3 = w − (b3 − s)− qpe
γrm + (1− p) eγ∆2 − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆3
γr
.
Notice that (8) establishes a one-to-one relationship between {∆2,∆3} and
{b2, b3}. If we subtract the two equations in (8) it is easy to see that (∆2 −∆3) is
a monotonously increasing function of b3− b2 that crosses the origin. Furthermore,
whenever ∆2 is larger than ∆3, beneÞts are necessarily larger for long run than for
short run unemployed.
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2.2 Incentive constraints
2.2.1 Incentives to move
Now, consider a person who has lost her job and has the ability to move. She
should be induced to do so voluntarily. If her assets at separation were At, her
value immediately after moving is
V1 (At −m) = −1
r
e−γr(At−m)e−γσ1 .
We compare this to the value of a one-period deviation, i.e., the value if she does
not move during this unemployment spell, given by
V2 (At) = −1
r
e−γrAte−γσ2 .
To induce moving we need V1 (At −m) ≥ V2 (At) . It follows immediately that
this can be written
∆2 ≥ rm. (9)
We label (9) the ICM-condition. Note that ICM-condition is independent of
assets, implying that it can never be individually rational to wait in the short-term
unemployment state and move later, while still in state 2.9
Note that the ICM is independent of ∆3. This does not mean that the incentives
to move are independent of long-run beneÞts. On the contrary, as seen in (8), ∆2
depends on ∆3, which, in turn, depends on b3. However, an important advantage
of focusing on the incentives ∆2 and ∆3, is that incentive constraints in state j can
be expressed in terms of ∆j only. As we will see, this orthogonality will hold also
for the remaining incentive constraints, discussed in the next subsection, and will
make the analysis simple.
9Of course, when b2 > b3, it could be individually rational not to move in state 2 but move
when state 3 is entered.
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2.2.2 Incentives to search
Let us now consider the incentives for searching during unemployment. A long-term
unemployed who does not search will remain unemployed for ever, consuming her
permanent income, given by b3 − τ + rAt. This yields an intertemporal utility of
−1re−γrAte−γ(b3−τ). The long-term unemployed will search if this is less than her
intertemporal utility when searching, i.e., if V3 (At) ≥ −1re−γrAte−γ(b3−τ). This,
again, is independent of assets, and can be written as
σ3 ≥ b3 − τ . (10)
Using this in the individual dynamic budget constraint yields,
úAt = rAt + b3 − τ − s− σ3 − rAt
≤ rAt + b3 − τ − s− (b3 − τ)− rAt = −s
As we see, (10) requires that consumption for a long term unemployed (c3 (At) =
σ3 + rAt) must be larger than or equal to her income net of taxes (b3 − τ + rAt).
This means that incentives have to be at least large enough to make the individual
willing to borrow to Þnance her search cost. This, in turn, means that consumption
necessarily falls as long as the individual remains long-term unemployed. Using (7),
(10) can be written as
∆3 ≥ −
ln
¡
1− γrsh
¢
γ
≡ ∆
³rs
h
; γ
´
. (11)
which we label the IC3-condition. As we see, the increase in consumption a long-
term unemployed achieves by Þnding a job needs to be larger than ∆
¡
rs
h ; γ
¢
where
∆ is a strictly increasing function of rs/h and, in addition, only dependent on γ.
Since the gain from searching comes in the future, it is intuitive that the potential
reward, ∆3, has to be larger as discounting increases. It is also intuitive that
increased search cost and reduced search eﬀectiveness requires a larger reward for
individuals to want to search. The sign of the derivative, ∂ ∆
¡
rs
h ; γ
¢
/∂γ is on the
other hand non-monotonic, being positive for low values of γ and becoming negative
as γ approach h/rs.
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Note that while the search incentive in general depends on the extent to which
the value function increases when employment is gained, in this case, the incentive
constraint can be written as only depending on the extent to which consumption
increases at re-employment. This is due to the stationary risk-environment we
impose in combination with the CARA utility.
Now, we turn to search incentives for short-run unemployed. For the short term
unemployed, we compute the value associated with a one-period deviation, i.e., no
search in the current employment state, conditional on searching in future states.
In the appendix, we show that this value is −e−γrAte−γc2,nr where σ2,n satisÞes
σ2,n = b2 − τ +
f
¡
1− e−γ(σ3−σ2,n)¢
γr
.
The IC2 constraint is σ2 ≥ σ2,n,which can be written as
∆2 ≥ ∆
³rs
h
; γ
´
, (12)
which we label the IC2-condition.
As noted in the previous subsection, the incentive constraints for the two state,
IC2 and IC3, are orthogonal, only depending on the relevant incentive (∆2 or ∆3)
and exogenous variables. To repeat, this does, of course, not mean that only b2 (b3)
matters for search incentives of the short-term (long-term) unemployed. On the
contrary, both b2 and b3 aﬀect consumption in all states, as seen in (7). However,
individual optimization and access to markets for saving and borrowing imply the
value function to be a monotonous transformation of consumption. Thus, the wedge
between consumption in the current state and during employment is a suﬃcient
statistic to determine if search incentives are suﬃciently strong.
Furthermore, note that the RHS of IC2 and IC3 are identical. In other words,
given that the hiring probability and search costs are the same for short-term un-
employed and long-term unemployed, individuals in these states need the same
reward in terms of consumption increases after a successful job-search to be willing
to search. Allowing diﬀerent search costs and/or hiring probabilities, would simply
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change the argument of the ∆ (.) function, while maintaining orthogonality between
the two constraints.
The optimal insurance contract should then be chosen to maximize σ1 = w −
τ − q peγrm+(1−p)eγ∆2−1γr , over ∆2 and ∆3, subject to the incentive constraints (9),
(11) and (12), and the actuarial fairness constraint (deÞned by (3) and (8)).
3 Characterization of the preferred UI-scheme
Since the focus of this paper is the incentive problems associated with moving, we
start the analysis with the assumption that search costs are zero, while moving costs
are strictly positive. SpeciÞcally, we Þrst assume that only the ICM condition binds,
i.e., that ∆2 = rm > 0. In addition, we require ∆3 ≥ ∆ (0; γ) = 0. If this constraint
were violated, long-term unemployed would strictly prefer to remain unemployed.
To provide an understanding of our analytical results below, we start by deriving
a graphical representation of the problem. By substituting for τ in the objective
function, solving (8) for beneÞts and substituting into (3), and dividing by Π2 the
problem can be written
max
∆2,∆3
½
K +∆2 +
f
h+ r
∆3 − 1
γr
µ
(r + h+ f) eγ∆2 + he−γ∆2 + feγ(∆3−∆2) +
fh
h+ r
e−γ∆3
¶¾
(13)
s.t. ∆2 ≥ rm,∆3 ≥ 0.
where K is a constant.10
For ∆3,∆2 ≥ 0 and {∆3,∆2} 6= {0, 0} , the indiﬀerence curve for this problem
10The constant is given by
K ≡ w (1−Π2 −Π3)
Π2
− (Π2 +Π3)
Π2
s
−1−Π2 −Π3
Π2
q
r
peγrm − 1
γ
+
1
γr
µ
h+ f
µ
1 +
h
h+ r
¶¶
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has a slope given by
d∆2
d∆3
|σ1 constant = −
f
h+r − 1r
³
feγ(∆3−∆2) − fhh+re−γ∆3
´
1− 1r
¡
(r + h+ f) eγ∆2 − he−γ∆2 − feγ(∆3−∆2)¢ (14)
In Þgure 1, we make a graphical representation of the problem. The bliss point
is at full insurance, when {∆3,∆2} = {0, 0}. The indiﬀerence curves have ellip-
tical shapes around this point, of which we are only interested in the segment in
the positive quadrant since incentive compatibility certainly requires ∆3,∆2 ≥ 0.
SpeciÞcally, the slope of an indiﬀerence curve is; i) negative at ∆3 = ∆2, and ii)
positive at ∆3 = 0 and ∆2 > 0. The ICM constraint is satisÞed for all values of ∆2
above the ICM-curve. Since the ICM-curve is horizontal, the Þrst fact implies that
beneÞts at the tangency must satisfy ∆3 < ∆2 ⇔ b3 > b2. The second fact implies
that at the tangency, ∆3 > 0, implying a strictly positive search incentive also for
the long-term unemployed.
To conclude, the tangent to the ICM constraint (∆2 ≥ rm) must be at a point
where ∆2 > ∆3 > 0, implying b2 − s < b3 − s < w. To understand these results,
note that when ∆3 = 0 while ∆2 = rm, long-term unemployed are as well of as
the employed (given assets) and their expected marginal utility is relatively low. A
reallocation from long-term to short-term beneÞts therefore increases the value of
the insurance so the tax-cost of providing a given insurance value can be reduced.
Thus, indiﬀerence curves have positive slopes at∆3 = 0,∆2 > 0. On the other hand,
when ∆2 = ∆3 (i.e., when b2 = b3) the opposite happens. The expected marginal
utility of a long-run unemployed is larger than for a short term unemployed, as assets
are depleted during the unemployment spell (see Hassler and Rodr´õguez Mora (1999)
for more on this). A reallocation from long-term to short-term beneÞts therefore
increases the overall value of the insurance.
The economic reason for our results can now be phrased in the following way;
To separate individuals who have the option to move from those who have not, a
positive ∆2 is required. However, this does not call for an ineﬃcient structure of
the beneÞt schedule. SpeciÞcally, starting from a ßat beneÞt schedule, the welfare
14
D2
D3
ICMrm
Figure 1: Indiﬀerence curve (constant σ1) and Incentive Constraint for Moving
in all states can be increased, while maintaining the necessary wedge ∆2 = rm, by
increasing beneÞts for long-term unemployed and reducing beneÞts for short-term
unemployed. The reason for this is that expected marginal utility is higher for
individuals who have been unemployed for a long time. The optimum is, however,
reached before beneÞts to long-term unemployed are high enough to make the latter
indiﬀerent between having a job and staying unemployed.
Now, let us derive closed-form solutions to our problem. Using the binding ICM
condition ∆2 = rm to substitute for ∆2, the objective function, σ1, can be rewritten
as w − τ − q eγrm−1γr where everything except τ is exogenous. In other words, the
problem is to minimize taxes over ∆3, respecting actuarial fairness and that beneÞts
must be consistent with the chosen ∆3 and ∆2 = rm. After removing constants
from the objective function, the problem can then be written
max
∆3∈R+
(
Π3
µ
∆3 − he
−γ∆3
γr
¶
−Π2f e
γ(∆3−rm)
γr
)
. (15)
These terms have straightforward interpretations; the Þrst term is due to the
beneÞt of reducing the tax-cost of long-term beneÞts. This term is increasing in
∆3 since higher ∆3 is achieved by lower beneÞts for long-term unemployed, which
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reduces taxes in proportion to the ADP of long term unemployment Π3. Note that
this tax reduction comes from two sources; there is a direct eﬀect that is proportional
to ∆3 but there is also a indirect eﬀect, captured by the second term inside the
parenthesis. Long-term unemployed Þnd jobs at a positive rate h. The prospect of
Þnding a job keeps up consumption so that it falls less than proportionally to the
reduction in beneÞts. Conversely, given an increase in ∆3, beneÞts can be reduced
more than proportionally.
The second term in (15) is due to the beneÞt of reducing tax cost of short-term
beneÞts. It is decreasing in ∆3 since less consumption for long-term unemployed
has a negative impact on consumption also of the short-term unemployed, propor-
tional to f. As ∆3 increases, beneÞts to the short-term unemployed must therefore
increase to keep ∆2 = rm. This has a tax-cost proportional to the ADP of short-run
unemployment Π2.
The second derivative of (15) with respect to ∆3 is strictly negative, the Þrst
derivative is strictly positive when ∆3 = 0, and strictly negative for ∆3 = rm.
Thus, the unique solution to the problem is obtained by the solution to the Þrst-
order condition, given by
∆∗3 = −
ln
µq¡
r
2h
¢2
+ e−γrm
¡
h+r
h
¢− r2h¶
γ
> 0,
which implies (from 8), that
b∗3 − b∗2 = rm−∆∗3 +
¡
f + he−γ∆3
¢ 1− e−γ(rm−∆∗3)
γr
> 0, (16)
where stars denote optimal values.
Notice also that since the solutions for ∆3 and b3 are independent of f , we
see that b2 falls monotonically in f. That is, as the duration of the short-term
unemployment spell falls, the diﬀerence b3 − b2 should increase.11
11It can be shown that the derivative of the objective function with respect to f is always
positive. Low values of f is an ineﬃcient way of inducing separation between those who can move
and those who cannot, as agents expect to spend a longer stochastic time suﬀering the low short-
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As is clear from the analysis above, a reduction inm reduces∆2 and allows more
generous unemployment insurance. Such a reduction could be achieved by subsidies
to moving or retraining. However, full compensation is unlikely to be optimal in
reality. Suppose, realistically, that individuals with a job sometimes experience a
preference or productivity shock, making another job or a job in another location
more attractive than the current. Suppose also, that these shocks are not large
enough to induce voluntary separation and moving if the individual has to pay the
moving cost herself. Clearly, such moves are then not socially optimal.
The insurer would now like to fully subsidize the moving cost of individuals
who involuntarily are separated from their job, but not subsidize it for individuals
who voluntary separate in order to claim the subsidy. This, however, is infeasible
if the insurer cannot distinguish voluntary and involuntary separations. Therefore,
we argue that although partial subsidies may be feasible and, in fact, optimal, full
subsidization is not. More speciÞcally, it seems clear that subsidies should be as
large as possible, without inducing ineﬃcient voluntary separation. We could thus
interpretm as the cost of moving or retraining net of the optimal subsidy. Although
this point could be formalized by introducing preference shocks along the lines just
described, we abstain in order not to complicate the analysis unnecessarily.
3.1 Search costs
We can now easily analyze the conditions such that IC2 and IC3 are satisÞed despite
positive search costs. Graphically, the constraints are simply horizontal and vertical
lines and all values of ∆2(∆3) above (to the right of) these lines imply that the
respective constraints are satisÞed. If search costs are suﬃciently small, speciÞcally,
run beneÞts. Without showing this formally, we conjecture that if lump-sum beneÞts were allowed,
the best policy would be to punish unemployment by a lump-sum unemployment tax when an
individual becomes unemployed. In reality, however, it may be politically diﬀcult or even infeasible
to implement a lump-sum punishment on those who loose their jobs. Similarily, a lower bound on
b2 might be imposed for political reasons, in which case this would pin down f from (16).
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if
∆∗3 ≥ ∆
³rs
h
; γ
´
(17)
none of the search constraints bind, as shown in Þgure 2.
D2
D3
ICMrm
IC2
IC3
 ( ; )rs h γ∆
 ( ; )rs h γ∆
Figure 2: Low search costs.
Increasing search costs shift out IC2 and IC3 and eventually, (17) is no longer
satisÞed at the point where the ICM constraint is tangent to the indiﬀerence curve.
This situation is depicted in Þgure 3. Here, the point where the ICM is tangent
to the dotted indiﬀerence curve satisÞes the IC2 constraint, but not the IC3 con-
straint. Thus, ∆3 must be increased but since the IC3 and the ICM constraint are
orthogonal, ∆2 need not be changed. The optimal point is where the ICM and the
IC3 constraint cross and, clearly, ∆3 remains smaller than ∆2 implying b2 < b3.
SpeciÞcally, ∆2 should be set equal to rm and equal ∆3 to ∆
¡
rs
h ; γ
¢
. This means
that individuals will be indiﬀerent in the choice of moving and that long-term unem-
ployed are indiﬀerent to searching, while the short-term unemployed strictly prefer
to search.
A further increase in search costs will eventually call for a situation like in graph
4. Here both search constraints bind, while the moving constraint is slack. BeneÞts
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Figure 3: Moderate search costs.
are constant over time since ∆2 = ∆2 = ∆
¡
rs
h ; γ
¢
.12
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that there are reasons to believe that an important
moral hazard problem associated with unemployment insurance has been neglected
in the previous literature. This problem stems from the fact that unemployed in-
dividuals sometimes have the option to make an up-front investment that could
increase their chances of Þnding a job. Examples of such investments are retraining
and moving to another location. Since it is reasonable to assume that it is dif-
Þcult or impossible to observe who has these options, the UI system should give
incentives for people to take advantage of any reasonable option to increase their
labor market prospect. By deriving analytical closed-form solutions for the optimal
two-tier system, we have shown that such incentives can be provided without reduc-
ing the value of the unemployment insurance excessively. This requires an initial
12This is special case of the result in Werning (2002) who shows that constant beneÞts are optimal
under CARA utility in a general class of UI-schemes.
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Figure 4: High search costs.
period of relatively low beneÞts. The intuition here is straightforward, by setting
initial beneÞts at a low level, individuals with good opportunities to get new jobs
are induced to exploit these. On the other hand, individuals with worse opportuni-
ties value insurance against long-term unemployment more than insurance against
short-term unemployment. The value of the UI system can therefore be maintained
by providing generous beneÞts after the initial period.
We have assumed that individuals can self-insure via unobservable savings, i.e.,
that individual consumption is unobservable or uncontractable. If the insurer has
control over the consumption of the individual, it is well known that there would
be a tendency to provide a downward sloping path of consumption (and beneÞts, if
the individual has no other income)to provide good search incentives. Nevertheless,
the point of this paper, that a period of low initial UI beneÞts is an eﬃcient way
to separate individuals who can move from those who cannot would still be true.
Which of the two eﬀects dominates would depend on how important the two diﬀerent
incentive constraints are. In a working paper version of this paper we provide a
model in which both eﬀects cancel, so that constant beneÞts are optimal.
We also assume constant absolute risk-aversion in this paper. This representa-
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tion of individual preferences is not necessarily the most realistic. Let us therefore
speculate on the consequences of allowing constant relative risk-aversion. In such
a case, the analysis is greatly complicated by the fact that, in general, search in-
centives would depend on asset holdings. Therefore, incentive compatibility would
not in general be consistent with a Þnite number of beneÞts that are independent
of individual asset holdings. However, the intuition for the results in this paper
appear not to be related to such eﬀects. In our model the preference for increasing
beneÞts arises from the need to separate between the two types of workers and the
fact that individual assets are depleted during unemployment, (which is true for
general speciÞcations of utility, in particular for CRRA, as shown in e.g., Hassler
and Rodr´õguez Mora (1999)). Both mechanisms are likely to be present also under
more general preference speciÞcations. However, since search incentives in general
depend on asset holdings and the duration of unemployment is likely to be corre-
lated with the individuals asset holdings, unobservability of the latter may have
consequences for optimal beneÞt time proÞles. For example, if the search incentives
are reinforced as wealth decumulates and individuals with long unemployment spells
are likely to have less wealth, this might call for increasing beneÞts. The analysis of
optimal UI design with hidden savings when individual behavior depends on asset
holdings is likely to demand numerical models. We leave this for future research.
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5 Appendix
5.1 The IC2 condition
The IC2 constraint is given by
σ2 − σ2,n ≥ 0.
Furthermore,
σ2 − σ2,n =
Ã
−s+ h
¡
1− e−γ∆2¢
γr
− f
¡
eγ(∆3−∆2) − e−γ(σ3−σ2,n)¢
γr
!
(18)
=
µ
−s+ h
γr
¡
1− e−γ∆2¢− f
γr
eγ(∆3−∆2)
³
1− e−γ(σ2−σ2,n)
´¶
≡ R (σ2 − σ2,n)
Clearly, R is a monotonously decreasing function that has an horizontal asymp-
tote at −s + hγr
¡
1− e−γ∆2¢ − fγreγ(∆3−∆2) (achieved as σ2 − σ2,n approaches in-
Þnity), approaches inÞnity as σ2 − σ2,n approaches minus inÞnity and R (0) =
−s+ hγr
¡
1− e−γ∆2¢. The solution to (18) is the unique Þxed-point of R. This value
is non-negative if and only if −s+ hγr
¡
1− e−γ∆2¢ ≥ 0. So
σ2 ≥ σ2,n ⇔ ∆2 ≥ −
ln
¡
1− γrsh
¢
γ
= ∆ (h)
is true
QED
6 Proofs not intended for publication
6.1 Proof that results extend to n unemployment states
Suppose we have n, states, then the consumption constants are
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σ1 = w − τ − qpe
γrm + (1− p) eγ(∆2) − 1
γr
, (19)
σ2 = b2 − s− τ + h1− e
−γ(∆2)
γr
− f e
γ(∆3−∆2) − 1
γr
,
σ3 = b3 − s− τ + h1− e
−γ(∆3)
γr
− f3 e
γ(∆4−∆3) − 1
γr
(20)
... (21)
σn−1 = bn−1 − s− τ + h1− e
−γ(∆n−1)
γr
− fn−1 e
γ(∆n−∆n−1) − 1
γr
(22)
σn = bn − s− τ + h1− e
−γ(∆n)
γr
,
Now, τ =
Pn
s=2 bsΠs, and the ICM constraint is binding, so ∆2 = rm, implying
that we should minimize taxes. Using the above, and ∆2 = rm we have
∆2 = w − b2 + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γrm
γr
+ f
eγ(∆3−∆2) − 1
γr
∆3 = w − b3 + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆3
γr
+ f3
eγ(∆4−∆3) − 1
γr
...
∆n−1 = w − bn−1 + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆n−1
γr
+ fn−1
eγ(∆n−∆n−1) − 1
γr
∆n = w − bn + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ(∆n)
γr
or
b2 = w −∆2 + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γrm
γr
+ f2
eγ(∆3−∆2) − 1
γr
b3 = w −∆3 + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆3
γr
+ f3
eγ(∆4−∆3) − 1
γr
...
bn−1 = w −∆n−1 + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆n−1
γr
+ fn−1
eγ(∆n−∆n−1) − 1
γr
bn = w −∆n + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ(∆n)
γr
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τ = Π2
Ã
w − rm+ s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γrm
γr
+ f
eγ(∆3−rm) − 1
γr
!
+
n−1X
i=3
Π3
Ã
w −∆i + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆i
γr
+ fs
eγ(∆i+1−∆i) − 1
γr
!
+Πn
µ
w −∆n + s− q e
γrm − 1
γr
− h1− e
−γ∆n
γr
¶
Removing constants,
τ = constant +Π2
Ã
f
eγ(∆3−rm)
γr
!
+
n−1X
i=3
Πi
Ã
−∆i + he
−γ∆i
γr
+ fs
eγ(∆i+1−∆i)
γr
!
+Πn
µ
−∆n + he
−γ∆n
γr
¶
First order conditions are
∆i∈{3,n−1};Πi−1
fi−1
r
eγ(∆i−∆i−1) −Πi
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆i−1 +
fi
r
eγ(∆i−∆i−1)
¶
= 0
∆n;Πn−1
fn−1
r
eγ(∆n−∆n−1) −Πn
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆n
¶
= 0,
where ∆2 = rm.
Suppose this is satisÞed for ∆3 = ∆4 = ...∆n = ∆.Then,
eγ(∆−rm) =
rΠ3
f2Π2
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
f3
r
¶
fi−1
r
=
Πi
Πi−1
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
fi
r
¶
fn−1
r
=
Πn
Πn−1
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆
¶
or
eγ(∆−rm) =
rΠ3
f2Π2
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
Π4
Π3
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
f4
r
¶¶
=
rΠ3
f2Π2
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
Π4
Π3
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
Π5
Π4
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆ +
f5
r
¶¶¶
=
r
f2
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆
¶µµ
Π3
Π2
+
Π4
Π3
+ ...+
Πn−1
Πn−2
¶
+
Πn
Π2
¶
=
r
f2
µ
1 +
h
r
e−γ∆
¶Ãn−1X
i=3
Πi
Πi−1
+
Πn
Π2
!
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Clearly, there exists a ∆∗ such that this is satisÞed, consequently ∆i = ∆∗∀i ∈
{3, 4, ..., n} satisÞes all the Þrst-order conditions. This allocation is implemented by
a b∗2 and a constant beneÞt sequence b∗3 = b∗4 = ...b∗n thereafter. Finally, we note
that since individuals face identical conditions in states 3, ...n,the allocation would
not change if the number of states is reduced as long as n > 3. Thus, the optimal
value of b2 is independent of n if n > 3. Consequently, the optimal beneÞt schedule
is to have b2 = b
∗
2 and a constant beneÞt level b3 = b
∗
3 thereafter.
6.2 Finding value functions
Guessing that the value function is −e−γ(rAt+σj) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the Bellman
equation for the employed is,
−1
r
e−γ(rAt+σ1) = max
σ
−e−γ(rAt+σ)dt
− (1− rdt)
·
(1− qdt) 1
r
e−γ(rAt+dt+σ1) + qdt
1
r
e−γ(rAt+dt+σ2)
¸
.
Using Þrst-order linear approximations and dividing by e−γrAt , this becomes
−1
r
e−γσ1 = max
σ
−e−γσdt
− (1− rdt)
·
(1− qdt) 1
r
e−γσ1 (1− γr (w − τ − σ) dt) + qdt1
r
e−γσ2 (1− γr (w − τ − σ) dt)
¸
Adding 1re
−γσ1 to both sides, dividing by dt and letting dt approach zero, yields
0 = max
σ
n
−re−γ(σ−σ1) + r + γr (w − τ − σ) + q
³
1− e−γ(σ2−σ1)
´o
. (23)
Similarly, for the short-term and long-run unemployed, we obtain
0 = max
σ
n
−re−γ(σ−σ2) + r + γr (b2 − s− τ − σ) + h+ f − he−γ(σ1−σ2) − fe−γ(σ3−σ2)
o
,
(24)
0 = max
σ
n
−re−γ(σ−σ3) + r + γr (b3 − s− τ − σ) + h
³
1− e−γ(σ1−σ3)
´o
.
Equations (23) and (24) are maximized at σ = σj , implying that for the Bellman
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equation to be satisÞed, the constants σj , must satisfy
σ1 = w − τ −
q
¡
eγ∆2 − 1¢
γr
σ2 = b2 − s− τ +
h
¡
1− e−γ∆2¢
γr
− f
¡
eγ(∆3−∆2) − 1¢
γr
σ3 = b3 − s− τ +
h
¡
1− e−γ∆3¢
γr
.
6.3 Derivation of 13
Doing the substitution in the text and collecting endogenous terms, we have
σ1 = w −Π2
µ
w + s− q pe
γrm − 1
γr
− (h+ f) 1
γr
¶
−Π3
µ
w + s− q pe
γrm − 1
γr
− h
γr
¶
− q pe
γrm − 1
γr
−Π2
Ã
−∆2 − q (1− p) e
γ∆2
γr
+ h
e−γ∆2
γr
+ f
eγ(∆3−∆2)
γr
!
−Π3
µ
−∆3 − q (1− p) e
γ∆2
γr
+ h
e−γ∆3
γr
¶
− q (1− p) e
γ∆2
γr
Dividing by Π2, and deÞning
K ≡
w −Π2
³
w + s− q peγrm−1γr − (h+ f) 1γr
´
Π2
−
Π3
³
w + s− q peγrm−1γr − hγr
´
+ q pe
γrm−1
γr
Π2
= w
(1−Π2 −Π3)
Π2
− (Π2 +Π3)
Π2
s
−1−Π2 −Π3
Π2
q
r
peγrm − 1
γ
+
1
γr
µ
h+ f
µ
1 +
h
h+ r
¶¶
we get
σ1
Π2
= K +∆2 +
f
h+ r
∆3 + q
(1− p) eγ∆2
γr
µ
1− 1
Π2
+
f
h+ r
¶
−he
−γ∆2
γr
− f e
γ(∆3−∆2)
γr
− f
h+ r
h
e−γ∆3
γr
= K +∆2 +
f
h+ r
∆3 − q (1− p) e
γ∆2
γr
r + h+ f
(1− p) q
−he
−γ∆2
γr
− f e
γ(∆3−∆2)
γr
− f
h+ r
h
e−γ∆3
γr
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In the following Þgure, we plot this, for r = 0.05, f = 1, γ = 1, h = 1 against
∆2,∆3 viewing it from above an cutting all values above -100.2. As we see, the
isoquant has an elliptical form.
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